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This study aims to analyze and test the effect of the variable Return On Asset and Audit Quality 
on earnings management practices at LQ 45 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
in the 2016-2018 period. The population consists of the LQ 45 companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The researchers took the sample with the purposive sampling 
technique and resulted in 33 companies. The audit quality used is the auditor in the rank the 
big-four. The type of research is associative causal with quantitative data and secondary data 
using descriptive statistical analysis, classic assumption techniques, multiple regression analysis, 
coefficient of determination (R²), and t-test hypothesis. The research result stated that Return 
on asset dan audit quality has an effect positive and significantly on earnings management 
practice. An interesting research finding is that the managers of LQ 45 companies tend to do 
little accrual earnings management. 
 
Return On Asset, Kualitas Audit dan Praktik Manajemen Laba Perusahaan LQ 45 di 




Penelitian ini bertujuan menguji pengaruh return on asset dan kualitas audit terhadap praktek manajemen 
laba pada perusahaan LQ 45 di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2016-2018, dengan sampel perusahaan yang 
konsisten terdaftar di LQ 45 selama tiga tahun yaitu sejumlah 33 perusahaan. Kualitas audit yang digunakan 
adalah auditor dengan peringkat “the big four”. Jenis penelitian ini adalah asosiatif kausal dengan data 
penelitian yang digunakan adalah data kuantitatif dan sumber data sekunder. Analisis data yang digunakan 
adalah statistik deskriptif, uji asumsi klasik, analisis regresi berganda, koefisien determinasi (R²) dan uji t. 
Hasil penelitian menyatakan bahwa return on asset dan kualitas audit berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap 
praktik manajemen laba. Kemampuan kedua variabel tersebut menjelaskan praktek manajemen laba juga 
cukup baik. Temuan penelitian yang menarik adalah bahwa manajer perusahaan LQ 45 ternyata cenderung 
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One of the managerial performance 
measurements is the corporate capability to 
analyze the profit information in the 
financial report. The stable profit earning 
in each period or the proportionally 
increased profit based on the capability or 
assets indicate the excellent corporate 
performance (Davidson, Goodwin, 
Stewart & Kent, 2005; Yaping, 2005; 
Iskandar & Suardana, 2016). The earning 
or profit information presented in a 
financial report becomes the targeted 
action of opportunistic managers to 
actualize their intentions. Managers use the 
opportunities to manipulate the corporate 
earnings, known as window dressing. Window 
dressing is a financial report presentation 
with certain accounting policies about the 
corporate profits or financial portfolio 
presented based on the certain intention of 
agents or managers. Thus, the report seems 
excellent (Zaidi, Akhter & Akhtar, 2018).  
The opportunistic actions by 
managers appear due to information 
asymmetry between the managers and the 
shareholders as the owners in which the 
managers are fully aware of the corporate 
operation activities and have the authority 
to arrange the financial report.  Managers 
are those with the information of corporate 
internal conditions and prospects. The 
investors or principals only use the 
presented information to know the 
condition and the prospect of a company 
in the future. 
Purwanti, Triyuwono, Irianto & 
Riduwan (2015) argue that managers must 
ensure corporate performance 
improvement although the economic 
situation has a lot of turbulence. They must 
ensure it even when the performance is 
lower so that the organization attempts to 
do anything to manipulate the data. Thus, 
the data seem positive from the managerial 
and financial performance perspectives in 
front of the shareholders. This action is 
called accrual earning management. This 
earning management aims to make the 
profit or earning equal for each year. Thus, 
it can be used as the managerial success 
measurement in running the organization 
(Bell & Carcello, 2000). The accrual 
earning management practices became an 
interesting issue for these recent two 
decades. It could be used as the financial 
report quality standard (Ali & Kamardin, 
2018).  
The agency theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) explains that the agency 
relationship appears when the shareholders 
employ agents or hire the agents to run 
business activities and delegating the 
authorities to decide on the agents. The 
frequent problem with the agency theory is 
the agent conflict because the shareholders 
and the agents have different motifs.  
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These different motifs or interests lead 
both parties to earn profits for themselves. 
The shareholders want the maximum 
return of their investment while the agents 
want higher bonuses or compensation for 
their performance. The conflict becomes 
the trigger of accrual earning management. 
This practice is mostly done by 
managers that are the agents of companies 
due to the agent conflict. The agents 
intentionally make and intervene in the 
financial report or manipulate the accrual 
components of the financial report. They 
determine or change the estimated value so 
the financial reports seem excellent in front 
of the shareholders. Yaping (2005) defines 
earning management, from various 
perspectives, as profit manipulation, profit 
deviation, and creative accounting report. 
Profit manipulation refers to the reported 
profit or earning by a manager with a 
certain demanded level but it is still under 
the accounting standard normality and 
corporate policy in which profits or 
earnings are the reflections of the 
corporate performance. On the other 
hand, the profit deviation is the profit 
manipulation made outside of the 
accounting standard normality. It is by 
reducing the corporate value expectation. 
The creative accounting report refers to 
earning or profit manipulation that is still 
under the accounting standard normality 
threshold. 
Scott (2009:325) defines “Earnings 
management as the choice by a manager of 
accounting policies or actions affecting earnings, to 
achieve some specific reported earnings objectives.” 
Sastradipraja (2010: 33) argues the 
managers committed the earning 
management based on the accounting 
principles and correct accounting 
standards, or normal earning and loss 
estimation. Thus, earning management will 
be useful for the company. This action is 
known as cosmetics earning management. 
Contrary, if the earning management does 
not adhere to the principles and the 
accounting standard, the earning 
management practice will influence 
negatively because of the obtained 
incentive. This action is known as real 
earning management. The investment decision 
and financial decisions by managers 
influence the incentive to commit the 
earning management. Therefore, real 
earning management is troublesome 
compared to cosmetics earning management. 
Some previous researchers found 
that earning management might lead to 
information asymmetry between the 
managers and the shareholders. Managers 
might also argue that their earning 
management practice had the purpose to 
improve the financial report, increase the 
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profit, and improve the market value 
(Alzoubi, 2016; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & 
Wang 2015; Leventis, Dimitropuolos & 
Anandarajan, 2011). Some previous studies 
found that the practice was an earning 
smoothing effort by replacing the losses of 
some periods so that the profit would be 
stable for each period (Kanagaretnam, 
Lobo, & Yang, 2005; Lobo & Yang, 2001). 
It means the managers commit the earning 
management.  
Return on Asset is a profitability 
ratio that assesses the corporate capability 
to create profit and as the standard of 
managerial success in running the 
corporate activities (Kasmir, 2015: 114). 
This ratio uses the asset as the corporate 
earning capability measurement. ROA is 
also the information source for the 
investors' considerations while assessing 
the performance. If the ROA is positive, 
the investors will receive the gain potency. 
Iskandar & Suardana (2017), 
Peranasari & Dhamandiaksa (2015), and 
Ramanuja & Mertha (2015) found that 
ROA positively influenced the earning 
management practice. The higher changes 
in ROA cause higher corporate earning 
fluctuation. Thus, the managers attempt to 
manage the earning so that the reported 
earnings will not fluctuate so that investors 
will believe. On the other hand, Irawan 
(2016) and Mahardini & Juwita (2018) 
found that ROA did not influence the 
earning management practice. It means the 
higher ROA of a company does not 
stimulate the agent to commit to earning 
management. The research discrepancy 
that occurred specifically in Indonesia, 
made the researchers wanted to investigate 
the influence of ROA on the earning 
management practice by managers 
(agents).  
One of the ways to detect the 
earning management is promoting the 
audit. Christiani & Nugrahanti (2014) argue 
that qualified auditors could detect the 
earning management of the clients. An 
audit service is a monitoring tool toward 
any conflict interest possibility between the 
principals or shareholders and the 
managers or among the shareholders with 
different ownerships. Some joint auditors 
in Public Accountant Office initiate this 
service. The audit quality could be 
measured with the measurement of the 
Public Accountant Office/KAP, the big-
four and non-big-four PAC, and the 
specialists of office auditor.  
In this research, the applied audit 
quality is the KAP auditor services, the big 
four because qualified auditors could find 
errors or bias in a financial report. These 
auditors will not accept any doubtful 
accounting practices (Bartov, Gul & Sui, 
2000). The big four auditors are more 
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qualified than those non-big-four auditors 
(Caneghem, 2004). Rusmin (2010) explains 
that qualified audit negatively influences 
the earning management practice. It means 
the audited financial report by reputable 
auditors could provide valid information 
and be free from earning management 
practices. Khalil & Ozkan (2016) also argue 
that reputable auditors could detect the 
manipulated earning because they gamble 
on their names as reputable auditors. Alves 
(2013) and Lin, Ly & Yang (2006) found 
that the audit quality of the big four 
positively and significantly correlated with 
the earning management practices. 
However, Davidson, Goodwin, Steward & 
Kent (2005) found an insignificant 
correlation between audit quality and 
earnings management. 
In Indonesia, the earning 
management issue becomes an interesting 
topic. The managers potentially commit 
the practice for their interests or attract 
investors especially from the large 
companies in the capital market. One of 
the preferred companies by investors is the 
listed company in LQ 45. It is because the 
performance is excellent and provides 
future benefits that are liquid. In 2016-
2018, the corporate trading capitalization 
of LQ45 is still high. It shows the high 
interest of the investors toward the stocks 
of the companies. Therefore, the 
researchers were interested to investigate 
how the earning management practices in 
the LQ45 indexed companies because the 
previous studies were not consistent.   
The managers of LQ45 companies 
had the skill to manage the earning and to 
predict the profits and risks. A higher ROA 
value shows the management's capability 
to earn many profits thus investors will 
trust the companies. The LQ45 indexed 
companies have high capitalization in the 
exchange. Many investors think of the 
excellent financial or fundamental 
conditions, the stable tendency of 
corporate manipulation, and better 
prospects observed from the produced 
ROA. Thus, they prefer investing in these 
companies. ROA shows the managerial 
capability to earn profit by using the 
applied asset in the operation. This matter 
influences the investors to predict the 
profit and risk of the investment. Thus, it 
influences the investors' trust.  
ROA influences the earning 
management practice. Higher ROA 
indicates the company’s capability to earn 
higher profit with the current asset. 
Companies with highly increased earnings 
have the potentials to decrease the earning. 
Thus, their earnings seem stable. This 
action also has something to do with the 
tax paid by the companies. Managers must 
show excellent financial management to 
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avoid any failures seen by investors. This 
action benefits the managerial party. The 
management can save the position or the 
official rank in the companies. It is because 
the manager's performance is considered 
excellent by the shareholders. Investors 
will trust the increased earning level 
because the corporate earnings reflect how 
the company gives advantages to the 
investors. Peranasari & Dhamadiaksa 
(2014), Ramanuja & Mertha (2015), and 
Iskandar & Suardana (2016) found that 
ROA influenced earning management. 
From the explanation, the first hypothesis 
formulation is 
 
H1: ROA influences the earning 
management practice 
 
Investors can consider the 
information quality of financial 
performance from the audit quality. The 
audit quality is observable from the auditor 
quality because it influences the audit 
results.  Auditors that work in the big four 
Public Accountant Office are seen as more 
qualified because they have some training, 
procedures, and accurate and effective 
audit programs than the non-big four 
PAO. Thus, the audit quality could 
minimize the earning management action. 
Most corporate financial reports of the 
LQ45 indexed companies are audited by 
the big four PAOs. Thus, the LQ45 
indexed companies are considered free 
from earning management practices. 
Christiani & Nugrahanti (2014) and Chen, 
Lin, & Zhou (2005) found the influence of 
audit quality on earnings management.   
Maijoor & Vanstraelen (2006) argue that 
the audited financial report by the big four 
is more qualified than those non-audited by 
the big four. It is because the information 
is free from discretionary accrual or earning 
management practice. From the 
explanations, the second hypothesis 
formulation is:  





This research is associative causal research, 
examining the influence of ROA and audit 
quality toward the corporate earning 
management practice of LQ45 indexed 
companies in Indonesia's capital market. 
The researchers took the samples with the 
purposive sampling technique. The criteria 
of the companies were companies indexed 
in LQ45 for three years. The results were 
33 companies. The researchers researched 
in 2016-2018. The operational definitions 
are:  
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1. Earning management as the dependent 
variable (Y) 
Earning management refers to the 
manipulations and decisions to reach 
certain demanded earning levels 
(Belkaoui, 2001). The earning 
management detection uses the Healy 




NDA =  
NDA = Estimated nondiscretionary accruals  
TAC  = Total Accrual  
TA  = Total Asset 
2. ROA as the independent variable (X1) 
Return on Assets (ROA) indicates the 
corporate capability to produce net 
profit based on certain asset levels. The 
calculation of ROA is by dividing the 
net profit after the tax is divided by the 
total asset (Kasmier, 2015: 201). 
 
 
Return on Asset  = Corporate capability to 
earn profit 
Earning after Tax = Earning or profit 
gained after being divided by 
tax 
Total Asset = Current asset + fixed asset 
3. The audit quality as the independent 
variable (X2) 
An audit service can detect the conflict 
of interest possibilities among the 
owners, managers, and shareholders 
toward the different amount of 
holdings. The audit quality could be 
measured with the measurement of 
PAO/KAP (The big four PAO and the 
non-big four PAO), the specialists of 
industrial auditors, and the dummy 
variable - the audited companies by the 
big four PAO (scoring 1) and non-big 
four PAO (scoring 0). 
The researchers tested the 
hypotheses by analyzing the significance or 
the regression (the beta coefficient) of the 
ROA and the audit quality on a certain 
significant level (α  = 5% ). The applied 
regression model is: 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + e 
Remarks: 
Y = Earning management 
α = Constant value 
β1 = the regression coefficient of ROA 
β1 = the regression coefficient of audit 
quality 
X1 = the produced profitability on the 
ROA 
X2 = the audit quality 
e = error 
The next applied analysis is the 
determinant coefficient (R2) to measure the 
Return On Assets =   
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capital model in explaining the 
independent model variations toward the 
dependent variables or as the influential 
proportion for all independent variables 
toward the dependent variable.    
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The researchers used multiple regression to 
examine the hypothesis. They had done 
this phase for all variables and found all 
variables had normal distributions and 
were free from autocorrelation. From the 
normality test, the one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test showed the value of 0.050, with 
a significant level of 0.962. The 
significance, 0.962 > 0.050, indicated the 
data had normal distributions. The 
autocorrelation test, with DW 1.459  
between -2 and +2 or -2 < 1.459 < 2, 
indicated the variables were free from 
autocorrelation.  
The descriptive statistics results of 
the variables are in Table 1. The table  
 
 Source: The processed data, 2020 
shows the median of earning management 
is higher than the mean. It means the LQ45 
indexed companies tended to commit less 
earning management. The same results go 
for both ROA and audit quality. It 
indicated an interesting phenomenon that 
even the initial assumption of the LQ45 
indexed companies hired the qualified 
auditing service but the data show lesser 
qualified audits. The ROA also has a higher 
median than the mean. It indicates the 
LQ45 managers, as the respondents, 
committed less "engineering" of ROA data 
in the corporate financial reports. 
This phenomenon was interesting 
especially if the focuses were on the 
earning management and audit quality data. 
The less "engineering" action of ROA 
seemed contradictory with the earning 
management based on the accrual, normal, 
and acceptable accounting standard and 
method (Dechow, Kothari, & Watts, 




 Table 1 The Descriptive Statistics Results 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
ROA 99 -1.00 31.35 5.0831 6.2700 5.80548 
AUDIT 
QUALITY 
99 .00 1.00 .6970 1.0000 .46191 
ENG MGT 
99 -.17 .11 -.0171 -.0121 .05605 
Valid N (listwise) 99      
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Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, cited in 
Asim & Ismail (2019). They found that 
80% of managers tended to participate in 
real earning management. They did it by 
manipulating the earning based on the real 
business asset (transaction). Therefore, the 
real earning management was difficult to 
detect because the manipulation existed 
within the real business transaction. Thus, 
the managers tend to use the earning 
management via the real business asset to 
cover their actions and evade the auditors 
or the policymakers (Roychowdhury, cited 
in Masri, 2018). 
 Then, the researchers analyzed the 
data multiple linear regression analysis to 
test the hypotheses. The output of the 
regression model analysis is in the 
presented equation (Table 2). 
The Table 2 shows the regression analysis 
result. The variable coefficient 
substitutions will result in: 
Earning management = -0.068643 + 










Source: The processed data, 2020 
The constant value is -0.068643. It 
means the independent variables, ROA, 
and audit quality is constant. Thus, the 
earning management decreases. On the 
other hand, the regression coefficient of 
ROA is β1= 0.003401. It means the ROA 
increase could increase the earning 
management with the assumption of 
constant audit quality variable. The 
regression coefficient of audit quality is β2 
= 0.021834. It means the audit quality 
could increase the earning management 
with the assumption of a constant ROA 
variable.  
The hypothesis test shows the 
significant influence of ROA toward the 
earning management practice with a 
significant level of 1%. Thus, the result 
accepts the first hypothesis, H1. It means 
there is a potency of corporate managers to 
commit the earning management practice 
to modify the corporate performance and 
gain the shareholders’ trust. Thus, the 




















0.008759  -7.837 .000 
ROA 0.003401 0.000963 .352 3.532 .001 
AUDIT 
QUALITY 
0.021834 0.010260 .180 2.128 .036 
Table 2. The Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Results 
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due to the excellent corporate 
performance. This motif triggered the 
earning management potency by 
manipulating the financial performance via 
return on assets presented in the financial 
report.  With stable return on an asset or 
the increased return on asset 
proportionally, it could give benefits for 
the investors. However, the managers had 
to think about the paid tax amount by the 
companies. This phenomenon made the 
earning management practice seemed 
under normal and tolerated levels by the 
accounting policy. This result was in line 
with the earning management practice 
theory. Some previous studies by Rifky 
(2017) and Iskandar & Suardana (2016) 
also found the influence of ROA on 
earning management. 
This result also confirmed the 
studies of Asim & Ismail (2019) in Iran and 
Nawaiseh (2016) in Jordan.  They found 
that ROA positively and significantly 
influenced earning management. Both 
researchers used ROA as the control 
variable to examine the influence of 
leverage and audit quality on earning 
management. It meant ROA caused the 
managers to commit to earning 
management. However, the applied data of 
earning management in their studies were 
different from this study. Asim & Ismail 
(2019) used the discretionary accruals instead 
of the non-discretionary accrual, adopted from 
the modified Jones’ model by Dechow, 
Sloan & Sweeney (1995). Nawaiseh (2016) 
used the discretionary accruals from 13 
banking companies in Jordan listed in 
Amman Stock Exchange. Their reason to 
use the discretionary accrual was the large 
companies usually applied greater accruals 
so the corporate accrual values would be 
abnormal. Besides that, the authors also 
used panel data instead of the time series 
data. Thus, it was different from the 
current research. The time-series data had 
some weaknesses of data consistency. 
Therefore, it could be a consideration to 
improve future studies. 
Then, on the t-statistic test result of 
the audit quality showed the significant 
influence of earning management practice. 
The audit quality of LQ45 indexed 
companies still had earning management 
practice potential with the discretionary 
accrual presented in the financial report. 
The earning management practice was still 
under the normal level of accounting policy 
and did not influence the corporate cash 
flow. This research result supported the 
study of Christiani & Nugrahanti (2014) 
and Nawaiseh (2016). They found that the 
corporate affiliation with the big four PAO 
significantly influenced the earning 
management committed by managers. 
Masri (2018) found that companies with 
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high audit quality could decrease the 
accounting managers’ flexibility that would 
encourage them to commit real earning 
management.  
This research result confirmed the 
descriptive data that the managers of LQ45 
tended to commit less accrual earning 
management. This matter could cause the 
managers to use the big four PAO audit 
service to create accrual accounting 
parameters. Therefore, they tended to 
commit lesser accrual earning management.  
This finding was more interesting 
than the influence of ROA on earning 
management. It showed that audit quality 
had a greater influence than ROA on 
earning management. It meant the trigger 
of earning management, found in this 
research, involved lesser accrual earning 
management. The cause seemed to be the 
audit quality. Thus, this research result 
confirmed Masri (2018). The author 
investigated 213 companies in Indonesia 
listed in IDX from 2010-2013. The 
companies in the research used 
substitution methods for their earning 
management, from the accrual earning 
management into real earning management 
triggered by the audit quality. The audit 
quality decreased the accounting 
managerial flexibility. 
The next analysis was based on the 
observation of the reliability of the model 
to explain the phenomena. It was by 
measuring the determinant coefficient with 
Adjusted R Square. The determinant 
coefficient value is in Table 3. 
 
  Table 3. The Determinant Coefficient 
 
Source: The processed data, 2020 
 
The table shows the determinant 
coefficient of the model (adjusted R2) is 
0.376. It means the return on asset and audit 
quality influence the earning management 
with a percentage of 37.6%. The remaining 
percentage, 62.4%, was from the 
unobserved variables. It proved that ROA 
and audit quality could averagely explain 
the earning management committed by 
LQ45 managers. Although this matter was 
excluded from the research hypotheses the 
results showed ROA and audit quality were 
the important predictors of earning 
management (Nawaiseh, 2016; Asim & 
Ismail, 2019; Masri, 2018). Therefore, the 
next researchers should consider this 
variable as the control variable to conduct 













1 .634a .402 .376 .04427 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ROA, K.AUDIT 
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CONCLUSION AND LIMITATION 
 
From the data analysis results, the 
hypothesis test, and the discussion about 
the LQ45 indexed companies listed in IDX 
from 2016-2018, ROA influenced the 
earning management. It was because of the 
managers' motivations to commit to 
earning management based on their 
intention to obtain maximum bonuses 
from their performance. On the other 
hand, the audit quality variable influenced 
the earning management although the 
managers did it by presenting the 
discretionary accrual. Thus, the management 
was still under normality and the corporate 
cash flow did not show any significant 
changes.  
Companies must pay attention to 
the results about audit quality and so do 
shareholders. Higher audit quality 
decreases accounting flexibility so that 
managers tended to commit to real earning 
management. This result should be 
confirmed by future studies in a specific 
manner, by connecting the real earning 
management, the audit quality, and the 
accounting flexibility. 
The limitations of this research 
were the applied variables to detect the 
earning management practice, only with 
ROA and audit quality. There were many 
variables to detect the earning 
management, such as net profit margin. Good 
Corporate Governance, debt to equity, and other 
performance measurement variables. The 
researchers suggest the future researchers 
examine the other influential variables, 
outside of ROA and audit quality. Thus, 
these variables could be used as the control 
variables because of their excellent 
contributions toward earning management. 
Thus, future studies should explain clearly 
the other variable influences outside of 
ROA and audit quality toward the earning 
management. 
Besides that, the applied data in 
this research were time series so they must be 
checked in terms of reliability with the 
panel data. Thus, the data analysis method 
should be adjusted to create perfect 
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